submitted for the Parameter Committee after Technical Steering Committee endorsement, repeating the 52.8% delegator penalty figure.

gov_action1whncs25w727rj5tml7lmv48gnaf9mm66sdjds8s3l306et7xmkdsqzqd7s2 · Protocol parameter change

Recorded by a member of the Institute · published 9 Oct 2026

What was reviewed

The proposal metadata anchor, whose on-chain hash matched. It covers the cut from 170 ada to 75 ada, the PCP-006 basis, guardrail checks and a reversion plan admitting that pools which lower their declared cost cannot be made to raise it again.

Primary rationale

A minimum pool fee makes it costly to run loss-making pools just to gather stake, and that still matters. But block rewards are now a fraction of what they were when 170 ada was set, so the fee takes a large share of the rewards of a pool making one or two blocks an epoch. Its delegators pay for that however well the pool performs. I am voting Yes because the problem is clear and the fix is simple. Nobody has to lower their fee. The Parameter Committee reached consensus on this value, and Input Output Research separately concludes that a high floor is more likely to reward large operators splitting stake than to deter it. The downside is confined to how existing rewards are shared; block production and security are untouched. The benefit is modest. The ledger shows the 2023 reduction did not change how most stake is priced, and the yield effect is material only for a narrow band of small pools. I am not claiming this alone improves decentralisation. A No, though, keeps a floor that now works against small pools, with nothing better until a minimum margin comes in by hard fork.

Risks

Sequencing is my main worry. Input Output Research pairs a lower fixed fee with a minimum margin to stop a race to the bottom, and this moves the fee first. Lowered declarations cannot be forced back up, so a mistake is only partly reversible. Hence the conditions below, and my request that monitoring be published. The bundled action failed with SPOs; this one legitimately needs no SPO vote. Changing pool economics without their consent, even within the rules, can weaken confidence in the process. The principle is under consultation as CAP #10, which is the place to settle it.

Uncertainty

Whether the 52.8% penalty, and its projection to 100% by early 2028, holds up independently. It comes from a single model and I did not recompute it. Whether the Technical Steering Committee's endorsement is in its own minutes. I saw Intersect's statement, not the minutes. What monitoring follows enactment, on which metrics, and what would trigger reversion. Only a general reference to Sybil-style fragmentation. Why DRep support for the standalone action is substantially lower than for the bundled one. I have not assumed a reason. I obtained no expert or peer input before the deadline. The questions are recorded; the answers are not.

Conflicts

I do not run a stake pool, but my own ada is delegated to a small pool that could benefit from a lower minPoolCost. That is a potential indirect interest, worth a fraction of a percentage point of yield on my stake, and it points toward Yes. Disclosed, and I voted. No relationship, financial or otherwise, with the proposer, the Parameter Committee or the Technical Steering Committee. My former employer, the Cardano Foundation, has no role here. No compensation, solicitation or inducement of any kind connected to this vote.

What could change this position

Published evidence, after enactment, that multi-pool operators are using the lower floor to fragment stake. I would then support reverting it. An independent recalculation showing the effect on small pools is materially smaller than claimed. A credible, dated path to a minimum margin parameter, which would make waiting for the paired change cheap.

Proposal source

Submitted on chain as a standalone action after the bundled version expired, with Cerkoryn as signed metadata author. I have not established who holds the return address.